Viv Ansanm coalition

… relationship between non-state armed groups and electoral geography. The 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive against Port-au-Prince demonstrated that the operational sophistication of armed group coordination has incre …

… with an untested cabinet. The Gang Suppression Force has not reversed Viv Ansanm's estimated 90 percent territorial control of Port-au-Prince. Diaspora TPS protections remain court-shielded but legisl …

… Force lacks confirmed troop contributions to replace Kenya and the Bahamas, Viv Ansanm territorial control remains near 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, and gang attacks on election infrastructure and farming …

… 2010 post-earthquake cycle. The August 24 to 25 Kenscoff massacre, in which Viv Ansanm killed at least 47 civilians within 10 kilometers of Port-au-Prince, demonstrates that the Gang Suppression Force has n …

… but the security environment driving that transition has not improved. Viv Ansanm controls an estimated 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, the Gang Suppression Force has not retaken significant territ …

… represents a zone previously outside the core gang-intensity perimeter. If Viv Ansanm is August 25, 2026 expanding its operational reach into periurban high-ground areas, GSF force dispersion becomes a co …

… its most operationally compressed crisis window since the February 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive as the CEP-scheduled August 30 first-round election arrives under conditions that objectively preclude safe m …

… pressure. Capacity to Act: Historically declaratory. Gang coalitions (Viv Ansanm) Position: Not party to electoral process. Pressure Direction: Disruptive documented pre-deployment offensive pattern …